The migrations from Central Asia, between the 11th and 13th centuries A.D., which carried Turkish-speaking tribes to Kazan, the Caucasus, and Anatolia, also deposited them in the provincesof Persia north of the Central Desert—especially in the most north-westerly province, Azerbaijan. These Turkish-speakers in Persia have at present no Turkish national consciousness. They are Shias, like the Persians, not Sunnis, like the Anatolian Turks. Tekin Alp admits that they still write letters in Persian and read Persian newspapers, and, as a matter of fact, Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, has been the centre of the Persian Nationalist movement.' Tekin Alp wishes to give the Azerbaijanis a " Turkish soul," and tries to prove that this would strengthen Persia internally. It would really split Persian Nationalism, and drive the Persians proper into hostility towards the Ottoman Empire, and the C.U.P. show no signs of committing such a blunder. Their policy during the war has been to support Persian Nationalism in Persia, and to inflame it against the Anglo-Russian regime. They are playing for a strong united Persia, freed from Anglo-Russian control, which would then make an alliance with the Ottoman Empire and fall under Ottoman hegemony.
If it became clear that the Anglo-Russian regime could not be overthrown, the C.U.P. might then play for the smaller prize, and try to detach from Persia her Turkish-speaking populations. The Osmanlis have always coveted Azerbaijan; they occupied it more than once during the 16th and 17th centuries, and they overran it for a few weeks in the winter of 1914-5, as an incident in their Caucasus offensive.
It is also possible that, if Persian Nationalism comes into power, it may adopt a chauvinistic internal policy, and try to Persianise its Turkish-speaking minority. In that case the Azerbaijanis might be roused to a consciousness of being Turks, and desire to cut themselves loose politically from Persia. They would turn first to the Tatars of the Caucasus, who also belonged to Persia before the Russian annexation, and who are only separated from the Azerbaijanis by an artificial frontier. The Azerbaijanis and Caucasian Tatars are bound in the end to gravitate in the same direction—whether towards the Ottoman Empire or towards Russia.
If it became clear that the Anglo-Russian regime could not be overthrown, the C.U.P. might then play for the smaller prize, and try to detach from Persia her Turkish-speaking populations. The Osmanlis have always coveted Azerbaijan; they occupied it more than once during the 16th and 17th centuries, and they overran it for a few weeks in the winter of 1914-5, as an incident in their Caucasus offensive.
It is also possible that, if Persian Nationalism comes into power, it may adopt a chauvinistic internal policy, and try to Persianise its Turkish-speaking minority. In that case the Azerbaijanis might be roused to a consciousness of being Turks, and desire to cut themselves loose politically from Persia. They would turn first to the Tatars of the Caucasus, who also belonged to Persia before the Russian annexation, and who are only separated from the Azerbaijanis by an artificial frontier. The Azerbaijanis and Caucasian Tatars are bound in the end to gravitate in the same direction—whether towards the Ottoman Empire or towards Russia.
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